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Deductibles vs. Coinsurance in Shallow-Loss Crop Insurance
Thomas W. Sproul, David Zilberman, and Joseph C. Cooper

Abstract
Shallow-loss policies take center-stage in many proposals for the current
Farm Bill. We examine the choice of deductible coverage vs. coinsurance to
show risk premiums and loss adjustment costs matter little when comparing
policies. Thus, policy makers should base decisions more on costs to
taxpayers than specific risk management features.

JEL Classifications: Q14, Q18
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Since the advent of the Supplemental Revenue Assistance Program (SURE) as a free
supplement to crop insurance in the 2008 Farm Bill, shallow-loss policies have
become an area of increasing focus in the farm safety net. These policies provide
coverage for smaller revenue losses in the range where revenues remain higher
than the guarantee provided by crop revenue insurance, and are more politically
palatable than direct payments in times of record-high farm revenues. While SURE
is history (Smith and Hewlett, 2013), debate continues in Congress over a range of
policy alternatives including deductible and coinsurance-style revenue insurance,
area coverage, whole farm vs. single crop, and even price supports, all of which are
heavily subsidized (CRS, 2012).
With so many alternative insurance policies proposed for the new farm
safety net, it is easy to assume that the exact risk-management features of each
policy should drive the discussion. This is not the case. Using the deductible vs.
coinsurance choice as a motivating example, we find that both risk premiums and
changes in loss adjustment costs are economically insignificant across a broad range
of shallow-loss policies, crops, and counties, relative to differences in the expected
value of claims payments. This result is driven largely by the nature of shallow-loss
policies, which act on smaller, more frequent claims around the peak of the revenue
distribution. Thus, our research suggests that policy specifics can be ignored if they
do not materially affect the level of claims payments, and policy makers should focus
almost exclusively on the expected cost of proposed shallow-loss programs. We do
not, however, address distributional issues of which constituencies are the primary
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recipients of subsidies. Differences in the House and Senate bills along these lines
are discussed in detail in Smith et al. (2012).
Deductibles vs. Coinsurance
We motivate the discussion by focusing on the choice of deductible vs. coinsurance
policy because this choice leads to changes in both risk characteristics and claims
adjusting costs, even when expected claims payments are held constant. It has been
well known by economists since at least the 1960s that a risk-averse decision maker
will strictly prefer deductible insurance to coinsurance when the two policies have
the same expected value of payments and the same premium. Figure 1 compares the
cumulative distribution of revenues under deductible insurance and a coinsurance
of the same fair value; since the outcomes under coinsurance are more spread out to
the downside, the coinsurance policy exposes the policyholder to additional risk
relative to a deductible. The risk premium is then defined as the amount of higher
expected value, in terms of claims payments, that the coinsurance policy must
provide to attain indifference between the two policies. This comparison applies to
shallow-loss crop insurance policies as well, which are generally written “stacked”
on top of an underlying deductible coverage.
For example, consider a farmer who takes the standard crop insurance with a
guarantee of 80% of mean revenues per acre. This arrangement would provide
dollar-for-dollar payments for losses below the 80% threshold. If we choose
parameters similar to the original SURE policy and ignore the disaster component,
we would have a coinsurance policy with a shallow-loss coverage threshold at 90%
of mean revenues, and with a 60% reimbursement rate. In the insurance literature,
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this policy would be identified as carrying 40% coinsurance, which is the insured
party’s share of the loss. The policy would pay sixty cents for every dollar of losses
below the 90% threshold, down to the 80% threshold where the standard crop
insurance kicks in. In contrast, the farmer may view a shallow-loss deductible policy
with an 86% threshold as equally appealing, or indifferent. The deductible policy
pays dollar-for-dollar losses below 86% of mean revenues, effectively just
increasing the crop insurance guarantee. The indifferent deductible threshold will
always be lower than the coinsurance threshold, but its exact level will depend on
the farmer’s risk aversion. For winter wheat farmers with moderate risk aversion in
Hyde County, South Dakota, we estimate that the expected value of claims payments
is $17.23 per acre under the coinsurance program above, but only $17.22 under the
indifferent deductible program with 86% threshold, so the risk premium is $0.01
per acre.
Figure 1: Effect of Deductible and Coinsurance on the Cumulative Distribution
of Revenues
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The deductible vs. coinsurance choice also affects the size and frequency of
claims, which may affect the administrative costs associated with claims payments.
When comparing insurance policies of equal expected value, the coinsurance
guarantee must be higher than the deductible guarantee, so switching from
deductible to coinsurance will lead to more frequent claims of smaller size. A wellknown model for claims adjustment costs (Raviv, 1979) includes a fixed cost per
claim, a variable cost based on the size of the claims payment, and possibly, returns
to scale. Thus, whether the change from deductible to coinsurance will lead to
higher loss adjustment costs depends on the exact cost structure of the insurer.

Estimating the Distribution of Revenues Per Acre
To evaluate these tradeoffs, we started by estimating probability distributions of per
acre revenues for representative farmers of various crops in a number of U.S.
counties. County-level and national-level yield data are drawn from the National
Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) for the period 1975-2011, and expected and
realized prices are taken from grain futures prices, according to USDA Risk
Management Agency (RMA) definitions. We used copula methods to estimate the
joint distribution of yields and prices at the county level, following Cooper, Delbecq,
and Davis (2012), and to forecast the empirical distribution for the 2012 crop year,
just following the final year of the dataset. Farm-level conditions are represented by
adding Gaussian white noise to inflate the standard deviation of county-level yields
until it matches RMA-calculated fair premiums for the 2012 crop year (following
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Coble and Dismukes, 2008). A sample, per-acre gross revenue distribution for
winter wheat in Hyde County, South Dakota, is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Kernel Density of the Empirical Revenue Distribution for Winter
Wheat, Hyde County, S.D.

Policy Indifference and Risk Premiums
We identify indifferent policies using an exponential utility function of wealth and
the full range of reasonable risk aversion coefficients, as identified in Babcock, Choi,
and Feinerman (1993). For each risk aversion coefficient, we used a numerical
optimization procedure to identify the deductible guarantee that makes the
representative farmer indifferent to the coinsurance parameters of SURE. We found
that the indifferent deductible guarantee was quite stable, often varying by less than
0.1% of mean revenues across most of the range of risk aversion coefficients when
baseline coverage was 70% or above, and by less than 0.2% at extreme levels of risk
aversion.
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Estimated risk premiums were stable as well, and small. For nearly all
combinations of crop, county, underlying coverage, and risk aversion, risk
premiums were estimated to be less than $0.15 per acre, and in many cases were
less than $0.05 per acre. These values are economically insignificant when
compared to insurance policies with fair values ranging from $10 up to $100+ per
acre in some high revenue corn counties. The maximum risk premium estimated
was $0.19 per acre for DeKalb, IL, where per acre revenues were $974.44 and the
90/60 coinsurance policy had a fair value of $48.31. Table 1 below shows estimated
means and standard deviations of revenues for select crops/counties, and the
highest risk premium estimated. The highest risk premiums were observed when
risk aversion was sufficient to turn down a $100 gamble with 3:1 odds of winning.
Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations and Maximum Risk Premiums Estimated,
Select Counties and Crops
Max Risk
County
Crop
Mean
Std. Dev.
Premium
DeKalb, IL
Corn
$974.44
$304.25
$0.19
McLean, IL
Corn
$1,009.80
$202.87
$0.17
Howard, NE
Corn
$905.61
$449.42
$0.13
Beadle, SD
Corn
$619.02
$319.81
$0.06
Montgomery, MS
Cotton
$942.76
$512.72
$0.13
Hoke, NC
Cotton
$850.92
$364.65
$0.12
Howard, TX
Cotton
$373.59
$373.89
$0.01
Logan, IL
Soy
$697.53
$198.33
$0.11
Sumner, KS
Soy
$395.42
$306.86
$0.02
Sanilac, MI
Soy
$570.16
$256.83
$0.06
Logan, KY
Winter Wheat
$470.77
$248.70
$0.04
Marion, OH
Winter Wheat
$449.92
$165.73
$0.04
Hyde, SD
Winter Wheat
$225.34
$74.48
$0.03
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Loss Adjustment Expenses
We obtained crop insurance performance data from the RMA Summary of Business
for years 1995-2010. These data included premiums, indemnities, and number of
units with claims by crop, county, coverage level and year, for all U.S. counties. We
also obtained a crop insurance industry report, the 2011 Grant-Thornton Report,
which uses a survey of U.S. crop insurers to estimate loss adjustment expenses as a
percentage of gross premiums (also for 1995-2010). Loss-adjustment expenses
were only available on a national aggregate basis, so we aggregated the RMA data
and combined the two into a simple regression model estimating the structure of
loss adjustment costs, as described above.
The model performed quite well. At a 99% significance level, we estimated
per-claim fixed costs of $132.41, variable costs of 4.39% of indemnity payments, and
returns to scale of 0.025 cents per claim, on a national scale. Given estimated
distributions of per acre revenues, these results can be used to estimate expected
savings (or costs) from switching between deductible and coinsurance shallow-loss
coverage. Variable costs will be identical for two policies with the same fair value, so
comparing deductibles vs. coinsurance means assessing fixed costs saved against
lost economies of scale.
We will use our estimated data for wheat in Hyde County, South Dakota, as a
back-of-the-envelope example. Before adjusting for claims frequency, fixed costs
average $1.64 per acre per claim, while economies of scale average $1.86 per acre
per claim when counting only the 599K+ insured units of farmed wheat in the
United States, and using an average of 80.67 acres per insured unit. Transition from
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our example coinsurance policy with SURE parameters to a deductible policy of
equal fair value actually results in higher claims costs, though they are tiny (about
$0.002 per acre). The higher costs arise because lost returns to scale outweigh the
savings of fixed costs, when comparing larger claims under a deductible policy
against smaller, more frequent claims under a coinsurance policy.
As with the risk premium differences estimated above, these values are
economically insignificant, even when extended to policies with different expected
values of claims payments. If we consider an 89% shallow-loss deductible guarantee
with base coverage at 80%, it has an expected value $2.11 per acre higher than our
sample 90/60 coinsurance policy. In this scenario, the higher expected value of
payments will lead to higher variable loss adjustment costs, averaging $0.033 per
acre. So, while variable costs are likely their largest component, any changes in loss
adjustment costs are likely to be dwarfed by increases in expected claims payments.

What Next?
As we witness the continued transition of the farm safety net away from direct
payments and towards subsidized insurance-style products like shallow-loss
policies, it is important to remember that risk management may not be the primary
concern driving these innovations. This article has presented evidence that farmers
are not likely to care about the exact risk management characteristics of shallowloss crop insurance, and that efficiency gains from saved loss adjustment expenses
are not likely to arise from subtle differences between policies. Thus, shallow-loss
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policies can be judged almost exclusively on the expected value of claims and
subsidy payments.
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